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THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990: A ROAD
NOW TOO NARROW
Luther Sutter*
1. INTRODUCTION

After extensive congressional hearings, President George Bush signed the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990' (ADA) into law. Hailed by some as
the most important civil rights legislation since the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2
the ADA promised to protect millions of Americans who, on account of past,
present, or imagined disability, had been denied equal opportunity in every
area of society. Congress recognized, however, that some individuals were
too disabled to perform any job. As a result, Congress required individuals
with disabilities to be qualified individuals, i.e., able to perform ajob with or
without reasonable accommodation. Consequently, the successful ADA
plaintiff must navigate the path between being disabled and being too
disabled. Some judges appointed by Republican presidents have narrowed
this path, and the ADA's promise remains largely unfulfilled today. This
article will examine the evolution of select cases interpreting the ADA. At the
end of the day, these cases demonstrate the unmitigated hostility many courts
hold towards the ADA.
How does one reconcile such a state of affairs? Obviously, the ADA is
a remedial statute.4 Remedial statutes should be construed liberally.5 Why,
then, are appellate courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
adopting an increasingly narrow view of a statute Congress obviously
intended to be remedial? Unfortunately, Justice Stevens suspects, as does this
author, that the courts fear a broad viewing of the ADA "will lead to a tidal
wave of lawsuits."6 But this author also suspects that there may be other
* L. Oneal Sutter is apartner with the Little Rock law firm of Harrill & Sutter, P.L.L.C..
where he represents plaintiffs in ADA, FMLA, Title VII, and other employment-related cases.
He earned his J.D. degree from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law in
1995, and his undergraduate degree from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock in 1992. Mr.
Sutter has spoken for the Arkansas Bar Association and various groups representing disabled
persons regarding ADA related topics. He is a member of the National Employee Lawyers
Association and a past Chairman of the ABA's General Practice Section's Committee on
Disability Law.
I. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1994)).
2. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.
& 42 U.S.C).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
4. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2152 (1999).
5. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2157 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
6. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2159 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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factors contributing to the narrowing of the ADA, at least within the Eighth
Circuit.
Although the Sutton Court narrowed the ADA's reach on an issue
squarely at bar, certain panels of the Eighth Circuit have shown much less
principle in cases interpreting the ADA, stretching disfavored defenses such
asjudicial estoppel into complete defenses, and, in some cases, deciding nonjurisdictional issues on appeal that the parties never raised. A review of cases
decided within the Eighth Circuit reveals thatthere is acommon denominator
in these cases-at least a majority of the judges on these panels were
appointed by Republican presidents. Of course, members of the federal
judiciary, at least in theory, are supposed to leave their politics behind once
appointed to the federal bench. Yet politics are an integral part of the
appointment process for federal judges, as was evident in the Bork and
Thomas confirmation hearings. Indeed, as of this writing, Republican
Senators refuse to confirm some of President Clinton's minority nominees as
federal judges.7
Indeed, some Republicans such as U.S. Rep. Charles Canady of Florida
believe, as a matter of politics, laws affording preferences to redress past
discrimination are inconsistent with our nation's most deeply cherished
principles.' Within the judicial arena, this sentiment is embodied in the
Eighth Circuit's refusal to intervene in matters properly within their
discretion.' The cases decided by these Eighth Circuit panels show an
undeniable trend toward either narrowing the scope of the ADA or creating
so much confusion that no lawyer can reasonably predict the outcome of any
ADA case.
During the past term, the United States Supreme Court decided four ADA
employment cases." While these cases certainly resolved the respective
7. See John Hei Iprin. Hatch Stalls Latino BYU Graduate 'sAscension to Appellate Bench.

SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 29, 1999, at A 1,available in 1999 WL 29637165. "[Tlhe nonpartisan
Citizens for Independent Courts noted that during the 105th Congress from 1997-98. some 14
percent of the nominations of white candidates failed for lack of Senate action or because the
candidates withdrew. But for the nominations of minority candidates, the rate was more than
twice that [of white candidates] at 35 percent." Id.
8. See George McEvoy. Opinion:

GOP Falls Back on Easier Target-Affirmative

Action. PALM BEACH POST. Feb. I. 1999. at 15A. "Racial preferences designed to compensate
for prior discrimination are inconsistent with our most cherished principles ....
" Id. (quoting
U.S. Rep. Charles Canady).
9. See, e.g.. Herrero v. St. Louis Univ. Hosp.. 109 F.3d 481.485 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771. 781 (8th Cir. 1995). "[T]he employment
discrimination laws have not vested in the federal courts the authority to sit as super-personnel
departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the business judgment made by employers.
except to the extent that those judgments involve intentional discrimination.").
10.

See Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg. 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999): Sutton v. United Airlines,

Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.. 119 S.Ct. 2133 (1999):
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disagreements among the circuit courts of appeals, the decisions created more
questions than they answered. If the past is any guide, the trend of courts
narrowing the scope of the ADA will continue. Thus, any practitioner should
enter this field only after careful deliberation.
II. DOES THE CLIENT HAVE AN ACTUAL DISABILITY?

From the beginning, all agreed that the successful ADA plaintiff bringing
a failure to accommodate claim must be, on one hand, substantially limited in
one or more major life activities.'' Likewise, on the other hand, all agreed
that, in order to succeed on a failure to accommodate claim, an individual
must not be too disabled, i.e., unable to work with or without accommodation.'12 Thus, in order to prevail on a failure to accommodate claim, the
successful ADA plaintiff, from the very inception of the ADA, must navigate
a narrow path between "not disabled" and "too disabled." Of course, this
unique threshold requirement is both a necessity and the downfall ofthe ADA.
Although the Supreme Court requires that cases must be examined on a caseby-case basis, '3 this author's review of Eighth Circuit published decisions
indicates that few judges appointed by Republican presidents have ever
written an opinion in which an ADA plaintiff has prevailed. Indeed, it is
sometimes possible to predict the outcome of many cases simply by knowing
the identity of the presiding panel. This reality leads to inconsistency in cases
interpreting the ADA, within the Eighth Circuit and among other circuits as
well.

One of the first disagreements concerning the ADA arose on the issue of
whether mitigating measures should be considered. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) decided that mitigating measures should not
be considered and issued interpretive guidelines accordingly. 4 Some courts,
however, ignored these guidelines while other courts deferred to them."I
Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp.. 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999).
II. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
13. See Olmstead v. Zimring. 119 S. Ct. 2176. 2190 n.16 (1999) (citing 28 C.F.R. §
42.511(c) (1998)).
14. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.20) (1998) ("[the determination of whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis.
without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices").
15. See, e.g.. Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding self-accommodations cannot be considered when determining a disability).
vacated. 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999); Baert v. Euclid Beverage. Ltd., 149 F.3d 626.629-30 (7th Cir.
1998) (holding disabilities should be determined without reference to mitigating measures);
Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co.. 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997) (same):
Arnold v. United Parcel Serv.. Inc.. 136 F.3d 854. 859-66 (1st Cir. 1998) (same). See also
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Thus, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Sutton to
resolve the conflict between the circuits. In Sutton, the plaintiffs had visual
impairments that were correctable to 20/20.6 United Airlines, however,
required its pilot applicants to have, at a minimum, uncorrected visual acuity
of 20/100 or better.' 7 The plaintiffs, maintaining that the court should defer
to EEOC guidelines for interpretation of the statute, argued that the question
of whether a person has a disability must be examined without considering
mitigating measures.' 8 The district court, as well as the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, rejected this argument.' 9 In Sutton, the Supreme Court
affirmed,20 creating far more questions than it answered.2'
In the Sutton opinion, Justice O'Connor first noted that Congress had not
authorized any particular agency to define "disability.' '22 In affirming the
Tenth Circuit, Justice O'Connor's analysis relied heavily upon Congress's
23
finding that 43,000,000 Americans suffered from some type of disability.
Although Justice O'Connor noted that the exact origin of this number was not
clear, she nonetheless concluded that "critically, findings enacted as part of
the ADA require the conclusion that Congress did not intend to bring under
the statute's protection all those whose uncorrected conditions amount to
disabilities.2 4 While Justice O'Connor wrote that the guidelines approach
was also inconsistent with the individualized approach of the ADA, the
Congressional finding that only 43,000,000 Americans suffer from some type
of disability remains the linchpin of her opinion.2" Consequently, Justice
Stevens observed that a "statement of congressional findings is a rather thin
reed upon which to base" a statutory construction.26
Obviously, the question is "What constitutes a disability after Sutton?"
Justice Stevens suggested that the majority opinion would necessarily lead to

Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464. 470-471 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that only some impairments should be evaluated in their uncorrected state). vacated,
119 S. Ct. 2388(1999).
16. See Sutton. 119 S. Ct. at 2143.
17. See id.
18. See id at 2146.
19. See id. at 2144.
20. See id
21. See id.
22. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145.
23. See id. at 2147.
24. See id (emphasis added).
25. See id at 2149.
26. See id at 2160 (Stevens, J.. dissenting) (quoting National Org. for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler. 510 U.S. 249, 260 (1994)).
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the exclusion of persons who used prostheses or wheelchairs. -7 Justice
O'Connor responded:
The dissents suggest that viewing individuals in their corrected state will
exclude from the definition of"disab[led]" those who use prosthetic limbs
or take medicine for epilepsy or high blood pressure. This suggestion is
incorrect. The use of a corrective device does not, by itself, relieve one's
disability. Rather, one has a disability under subsection A if, notwithstanding the use of a corrective device, that individual is substantially limited in
a major life activity. For example, individuals who use prosthetic limbs or
wheelchairs may be mobile and capable of functioning in society but still
be disabled because of a substantial limitation on their ability to walk or
run. The same may be true of individuals who take medicine to lessen the
symptoms of an impairment so that they can function but nevertheless
remain substantially limited.28
In the few months since Sutton was decided, this author has considered
the above passage carefully. The issue of medicine that cures is easily
resolved, since disabilities must be long term and severe. Necessarily, then,
conditions that are "cured" after a short course of therapy are not disabilities
and never have been. The difficulty arises, however, when a condition is not
cured, but controlled, by medication. One difficult example is the diabetic
who controls the level of his blood sugar with insulin. So long as his blood
sugar is controlled, that person is not "disabled." Should his condition
deteriorate, however, high blood sugar levels can cause confusion, blurred
vision, and even death. Thus, the individual would then be "disabled," since
disability, according to Justice O'Connor, is measured in the present tense.29
Therefore, an individual's status can change from "protected" to "unprotected" without notice. Where is the black letter rule in this situation? There
is none, and, in the end, the bar is left without answers.
What about prostheses? While prostheses have come far since the age
of the hook and peg leg, individuals who use these prostheses for arms and
hands may still be substantially limited in their ability to pinch, grab, and lift.
In many cases, a plaintiff's success will depend upon what major life activity
is at issue. If, for example, an individual has an arm prosthesis that does not
limit the individual's ability to lift, the competent plaintiff's lawyer will look
for and plead a substantial limitation on another major life activity. When
wheelchairs are considered, the analysis becomes more difficult. After all, an
individual required to use a wheelchair cannot, by definition, walk.
27. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153 (Stevens. J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 2149 (internal citations omitted).
29. See id. at 2146.

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

Most cases involving the major life activity of walking analyze the
disability by examining the distance a plaintiff is able to travel in comparison
to an average person in the normal population. In Zuppardo v. Suffolk County
Vanderbilt Museum,3" the plaintiff alleged that he was unable to walk more
than one-eighth of a mile without suffering severe pain and needing to rest.3
Accordingly, the plaintiff asserted that he was substantially limited in a major
life activity, namely walking.3'2 On the issue of his purported disability, the
district court held that "while [plaintiffs] ability to walk may well be
'affected,' it was not 'substantially impaired,' and he failed to prove he was
'disabled' as a matter of law."" But, an individual using a power wheelchair
can travel from point A to point B just as well as the average person. Indeed,
many power wheelchairs can travel several miles. So, under Sutton, some
courts could decide these individuals are not disabled, if one uses distance as
the benchmark.
This prospect apparently troubled Justice O'Connor, as demonstrated by
her response to the dissents. This response is less than clear, however. Given
the Sutton holding, the assertion that "[t]he use or nonuse of a corrective
device does not determine whether an individual is disabled" is spectacularly
obvious.34 Justice O'Connor's next statement that the determination of
disability "depends on whether the limitations an individual with an impairment actually faces are in fact substantially limiting" begs the question.35 If
one follows the distance approach that courts used before Sutton, then the
individual who uses a power wheelchair will not be disabled. Ultimately,
Sutton will force the plaintiffs bar to frame major life activities hypertechnically. Indeed, Justice Souter engaged in just this sort of exercise in
Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg.36
In Albertsons, Kirkingburg drove a truck for Albertsons, Inc. In 1990,
Kirkingburg was erroneously certified as meeting the Department of Transportation's (DOT) basic vision standards for commercial truck drivers, which
require corrected distant visual acuity of at least 20/40 in each eye and distant

30. 19 F. Supp. 2d 52 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd. 173 F.3d 848 (2d Cir. 1999).
31. See id at 53.
32. See id.
at 55.
33. Id. at 56. See also Banks v. Hit or Miss, Inc., 996 F. Supp. 802, 807 (N.D. III. 1998)
(finding plaintiff not "disabled" as a matter of law where she could only walk short distances
and could not stand for extended periods of time): Horth v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc.. 960
F. Supp. 873. 878 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff who could not sit or stand for more
than two hours without difficulty and had trouble walking could not show limitations were more
than moderate restrictions and thus. was not disabled).
34. See Sutton. 119 S. Ct. at 2149.
35. Id.
36. 119 S.Ct. 2162 (1999).
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binocular acuity of at least 20/40."7 When the error was discovered,
Kirkingburg was instructed to get a waiver of the DOT standards under a
waiver program begun that year.3" Albertsons, however, fired him for failing
to meet the basic DOT vision standards.39 After Kirkingburg received a
waiver, Albertsons refused to rehire him. Kirkingburg subsequently sued
Albertsons, claiming that Albertsons violated the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990.40 In granting summaryjudgment for Albertsons, the district court
found that Kirkingburg was not qualified without an accommodation because
he could not meet the basic DOT standards and that the waiver program did
not alter those standards.4' The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court.42
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, Justice Souter observed that the question
of whether Kirkingburg suffered from a disability need not be decided.4 3
Justice Souter, however, addressed the issue anyway." In his analysis, Justice
Souter apparently recognized the questions the Sutton opinion raised. The
first glance of hyper-technicality is Justice Souter's description of the Ninth
Circuit's mis-step:
First, although the EEOC definition of "substantially limits" cited by the
Ninth Circuit requires a "significant restrict[ion]" in an individual's
manner of performing a major life activity, the court appeared willing to
settle for amere difference. By transforming "significant restriction" into
"difference," the court undercut the fundamental statutory requirement that
only impairments causing "substantial limitat[ions]" in individuals' ability
to perform major life activities constitute disabilities.4"
At first blush, Justice Souter seems to have driven the final nail, since a
person who uses a wheelchair merely travels from point A to point B in a
different manner from those who can use their legs. If this were the end, then
ADA plaintiffs would surely be in trouble, but Justice Souter continues:
This is not to suggest that monocular individuals have an onerous burden
in trying to show that they are disabled. On the contrary, our brief
examination of some of the medical literature leaves us sharing the
Government's judgment that people with monocular vision "ordinarily"
will meet the Act's definition of disability, and we suppose that defendant
37. See id. at2166.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2166.
See id. at 2167.
See id. at 2168.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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companies will often not contest the issue. We simply hold that the Act
requires monocular individuals, like others claiming the Act's protection,
to prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation
in terms of their own experience, as in loss of depth perception and visual
field, is substantial.46
Kirkingburg could "see" well enough to drive a truck. Thus, mere differences
in perception are apparently not enough to constitute a disability. Accordingly, it will not be enough for persons who have a visual impairment to
simply allege a substantial limitation in the ability to see. Rather, an ADA
plaintiff will have to allege that her depth perception and visual field are
substantially limited. This is exactly the type of legal jargon for which
lawyers are notorious.47

Finally, perhaps the most attractive alternative available to the plaintiff's
bar will be to frame the issue of disability, in appropriate situations, with
respect to areas that require persons with disabilities to use human attendants.
For example, a person who uses a power wheelchair is frequently unable to lift
himself without assistance. Thus, the creative plaintiffs lawyer will plead the
major life activities of caring for one's self, bathing, and the like. While this
author would not be surprised by such a holding from some conservative
jurists, it is highly unlikely that an impartial court would consider a human
attendant a mitigating measure. The success of such a strategy will by no
means be assured-few in the plaintiffs bar will risk a lawsuit on this basis.
I11.
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
Judicial estoppel, sometimes called the doctrine against the assertion of
inconsistent positions or estoppel by oath, "prevents a litigant from attempting
to assert a position inconsistent with one that he has asserted in a previous
judicial proceeding."48 Judicial estoppel began to develop in the mid-1800s
in order to protect the integrity of the judicial system and uphold the sanctity
of the oath.49 Its aim was to prevent a litigant from "playing fast and loose
with the courts" by speaking out of both sides of his mouth, and to prevent a

46. Id. at 2169 (internal citations omitted).
47. Obviously, Justice Souter's opinion does have favorable implications. Justice Souter's
observation that the burden of showing a disability is-not onerous does toss a bone to those
seeking protection under the ADA.
48. Douglas W. Henkin, Judicial Estoppel-BeatingShields Into Swords andBack Again,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1711, 1711 (1991).
49. See id. at 1713.
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litigant from obtaining inconsistent results by winning before one court on one
assertion and before another court on a contradictory assertion.50
The application of judicial estoppel in the context of disability is
commonly thought to have originated in Beaufordv.FatherFlanagan'sBoys'
Home.' A close reading of Beauford, however, shows the court never even
used the term "judicial estoppel," much less established the doctrine of
judicial estoppel. In Beauford,the court only decided that the plaintiff lacked
standing under the Rehabilitation Act. 2 The facts reported in the Beauford
opinion do not reflect an inconsistent position. Ms. Beauford merely
admitted, before the district court below, that she was unable to perform her
the Beaufordcourtreached its decision only after expressing
job. 3 Ironically,
54
some regret.
In 1994, the defense bar began asserting judicial estoppel as a complete
defense to ADA claims,"5 but many courts addressing this issue disagreed. In
Swanks v. Washington MetropolitanArea TransitAuthority,5 the D.C. Circuit
held that the receipt of disability benefits did not preclude subsequent ADA
relief and rejected the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel, but allowed the consideration of prior sworn statements by the parties as a material factor, albeit
without the heightened standard of proof." The Sixth and Eleventh Circuit
Courts of Appeals rejected judicial estoppel and joined the District of
Columbia Circuit's opinion in Swanks, holding that the Social Security
Application (SSA) was merely one factor among many.58
After an extensive discussion of the holdings of other courts of appeals
presented with this question, the Eleventh Circuit also determined that a
certification of total disability on a disability benefits application is not
inherently inconsistent with being "qualified" under the ADA. 59 The Eleventh
Circuit reasoned that the SSA, in determining whether an individual is entitled
to disability benefits, does not take account of the effect of reasonable

50. Id.
at 1728 (quoting Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp. 834 F.2d 208, 213
(Ist
Cir. 1987)).
51. 831 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1987).
52. See id. at 771.
53. See id
54. See id
55. See Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Iii. 1994).
56. 116 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
57. See id at 586-87.
58. See, e.g., Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376,381-82 (6th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 2018 (1999); Talavera v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County, 129 F.3d 1214,
1220 (Iith Cir. 1997).
59. See Talavera. 129 F.3d at 1220.
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accommodation on an individual's ability to work.' Thus, the representation
of "total disability" to the SSA, while relevant, was not determinative. 6 '
Of course, the Seventh Circuit had long recognized that the "determination of disability may be relevant evidence of the severity of [a plaintiff's]
handicap, but it can hardly be construed as ajudgement that [a plaintiff] could
not do his job ...."' The Ninth Circuit, while not deciding the issue of
judicial estoppel, considered the Social Security Application asjust one factor
among many as well.63
Finally, the Tenth Circuit rejected the doctrine of judicial estoppel
outright because it precluded the search for the truth, which is the goal of the
modem Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit
did not raise the standard of proof, instead treating the Social Security Act
applications as simply one factor to be considered.65
There were, however, a few conservative courts that raised the standard
of proof for the ADA plaintiff who had previously applied for SSA benefits.
Yet the decisions of those courts using the label "judicial estoppel" tracked an
uncertain course. The most draconian decision was McNemar v. DisneyStore,
Inc.6 The McNemar court held that a plaintiff with AIDS who claimed an
inability to work for purposes of collecting disability benefits was estopped
from arguing that he was a "qualified individual with disability" under the
ADA.67 A subsequent Third Circuit panel noted that "McNemar has been the
object of considerable criticism" because of its failure to take into consideration the differing purposes of the Social Security Act and the ADA.68
The division within the Third Circuit itself, and among those courts using
the label "judicial estoppel," apparently did not escape notice. 69 The Eighth
60. See id.
61. See id. This refusal to establish a per se rule ofjudicial estoppel is in accord with the
ADA mandate that disability determinations be made on a case by case basis. See Sutton v.
United Air Lines, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2147 (1999); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The Court did hold,
however, that an ADA plaintiff cannot deny the truth of statements made on a disability
application. See Talavera. 129 F.3d at 1220.
62. Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190, 1196 (7th Cir. 1992).
63. See Kennedy v.Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1480-81 (9th Cir. 1996).
64. See Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 438 (10th Cir. 1956).
65. See Rascon v. US West Communications. Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998);
see also Swanks, 116 F.3d at 586-87.
66. 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996).
67. See McNemar, 91 F.3d at 617-20.
68. See Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 502 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1997).
69. The circuits also split over the issue of whether settlement in the prior proceeding
constitutes "success" and allows for the application of judicial estoppel. See Rissetto v.
Plumbers & Stearnfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 604-05, 605 n.6 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding "a
favorable settlement constitutes the success required," but noting the contrary view of the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir.
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Circuit subsequently applied a similar standard of proof, while appearing to
reject the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel. At the district court level in Moore v.
Payless Shoe Source, Inc."° the employer argued for a strict application of
judicial estoppel." The district court agreed and granted the employer's
motion for summary judgment.72 On appeal, Moore's counsel" argued,
among other things, that the Eighth Circuit had never recognized judicial
estoppel. 4 The employer characterized this argument as "ludicrous."7 5 In the
end, the Eighth Circuit-apparently recognizing the doctrine's flawed
application in this context-rejected the doctrine of judicial estoppel but
affirmed on the basis of an argument the employer never raised.76
Specifically, the Eighth Circuit held that "the ADA plaintiff is estopped
to deny the truth of ongoing sworn statements made in the SSA disability
1982)). See also Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding
settlement does not provide the prior approval of a court that judicial estoppel requires). And
in a further splintering of the circuit court decisions, some of the courts of appeals have stated
judicial estoppel requires reliance and detriment (or prejudice) to the opposing party. See
Young v. DOJ, 882 F.2d 633,639-40 (2d Cir. 1989); Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp.,
747 F.2d 1567, 1578-80 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Maitland v. University of Minnesota, 43 F.3d 357,
363-64 (8th Cir. 1994). In enacting the ADA, Congress sought to establish "clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (1994). Application ofjudicial estoppel obviously did
not serve these interests.
70. 139 F.3d 1210 (8th Cir. 1998), vacated. 119 S. Ct. 2017 (1999), on remand to 187
F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 1999).
71. See Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Moore v. Payless Shoe
Source, Inc., No. LR-C-95-799 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 23, 1996).
72. See Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, Moore v. Payless Shoe Source,
Inc., No. LR-C-95-799 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 29, 1996).
73. In the interest of disclosure, the author served as Moore's counsel.
74. Brief ofAppellant, Moore v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc., 139 F.3d 1210 (8th Cir. 1998)
(No. 97-2110).
75. Brief of Appellee, Moore v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc., 139 F.3d 1210 (8th Cir. 1998)
(No. 97-2110).
76. See Moore, 139 F. 3d at 1210. In reaching this decision, in addition to creating an
argument the employer never made, Judge Loken also ignored other clearly established maxims
of appellate procedure. See Davidson & Schaaff, Inc. v. Liberty Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 69 F.3d
868, 869 (8th Cir. 1995) ("The rule that [the Eighth Circuit] will not address arguments raised
for the first time on appeal ... applies even more forcefully when the appellant took the
opposite position in the district court"); Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc.,
139 F.3d 631, 637 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding arguments not raised after the close of plaintiff's
case are waived). In the district court below, Payless Shoe Source relied solely upon judicial
estoppel on the issue of whether Moore was a qualified individual with a disability. The district
court applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel and granted Payless Shoe Source summary
judgment. Ironically, the Eighth Circuit appeared to agree with Moore and rejected the doctrine
of judicial estoppel. The Eighth Circuit, however, created a doppleganger and affirmed the
grant of summary judgment. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
Even though Payless Shoe Source maintained that Moore was not disabled in the District Court
below, the Eighth Circuit "reinstated" its previous opinion.
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proceeding, but may attempt to prove that he or she is nonetheless a 'qualified
individual with a disability' for ADA purposes." The Eighth Circuit then
created a new evidentiary standard for unsuccessful Social Security applicants
who bring ADA suits, and held that any prior representations of total disability
are sufficient to support a grant of summary judgment against such an ADA
plaintiff unless the plaintiff presents "strong countervailing evidence that the
employee is in fact qualified."78 Thus, the Eighth Circuit, while ostensibly
agreeing with Moore on the issue on appeal-judicial estoppel--created a
standard that nonetheless walked and talked like judicial estoppel.
Against this background, the Fifth Circuit in Cleveland v. Policy,
Management Systems Corp.79 joined McNemar in all but the smallest detail.
Using the label "judicial estoppel," the Fifth Circuit created a "rebuttable
presumption" that persons who merely apply for Social Security benefits are
not protected by the ADA.' 0 A close examination of the Clevelandopinion
revealed that the "rebuttable presumption" operated in the same manner as the
Eighth Circuit's "strong, countervailing evidence" standard.8 The Eighth
Circuit, however, was surely reluctant to engage in the contortions required
to invoke "judicial estoppel." Indeed, in previous opinions, the Eighth Circuit
had recognized that it is "significantly more difficult to hold that judicial
estoppel will, as a per se rule, prevent a person who has claimed to be totally
disabled from subsequently proving that she is a qualified individual with a

77. Moore, 139 F.3d at 1213 (emphasis added).
78. Id. (quoting Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957, 963 (8th Cir. 1997)).
79. 120 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. granted in part, 119 S. Ct. 39 (1998), vacated, 119
S. Ct. 1597 (1999).
80. See Cleveland, 120 F.3d at 513-16.
81. Clevelandv. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1997). Both cases
appear to stand for the proposition that more than the plaintiff's own testimony of her ability
to work is needed to rebut statements made to the Social Security Administration. The Fifth
Circuit notes that an ADA plaintiff may be able:
to present credible, admissible evidence-such as [her] social security disability
benefits application, other sworn documentation, and [her] allegations relevant to
[the] ADA claim-sufficient to show that, even though [she] may be disabled for
purposes of social security, [she] is otherwise qualified to perform the essential
functions of [her] job with a reasonable accommodation ....
Id. at 518. In Cleveland, the plaintiff could not raise a genuine issue of material fact to rebut
the presumption that she was not protected by the ADA after she "continuously and
unequivocally" told the SSA that she was "totally and completely unable to work" by merely
stating she could perform her job with a reasonable accommodation. Id. In Moore, the court
ruled the plaintiff fell short of the strong, countervailing evidence standard by only offering her
own affidavit stating she could perform her job with a reasonable accommodation when both
the ALJ and her personal physical concluded she could not perform the duties of her formerjob.
See Moore, 139 F.3d at 1213.
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disability." 2 Thus, the Eighth Circuit raised the standard of proof and created
a doppelganger.83
Consequently, by "rejecting" judicial estoppel, in Moore the Eighth
Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit in all but name by creating a standard of proof
that was virtually unattainable. Whether called judicial estoppel or by some
other name, a rose is still arose. Thus, the result was the same-persons with
disabilities who simply apply for Social Security Disability benefits were
faced with a heightened standard of proof to proceed on an ADA claim, and
at most, would face an outright bar, unparalleled in the history of civil rights.
Against this backdrop, the United States Supreme Court granted the Cleveland
Petition for Certiorari.
On February 24, 1999, the United States Supreme Court heard oral
argument in the Cleveland case, while holding petitions for certiorari in the
Moore and Griffithcases.8 4 At oral argument, Justice Scal ia was unconvinced.
Justice Scalia continued tobe concerned about inconsistent statements.8 5 The
other justices, however, focused upon the differing purposes between the
ADA and the SSA. Perhaps the most telling point was the SSA's trial work
program. Under this program, a SSA recipient was allowed a period of trial
work, while remaining eligible for SSA benefits. How, then, could a
heightened standard of proof be justified? 6 Ultimately, the Supreme Court
rejected the Fifth Circuit's "rebuttable" presumption.8
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer stated that an ADA
plaintiff s application for SSA benefits was not entitled to greater weight than
any other piece of evidence. 8 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded
82. Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co.. 124 F.3d 957. 962 n.8 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Robinson
v. Neodata Servs.. Inc., 94 F.3d 499, 501-02 (8th Cir. 1996); Eback v. Chater. 94 F.3d 410 (8th
Cir. 1996)). In Robinson. the court observed that "Social Security determinations... are not
synonymous with a determination of whether a plaintiff is a 'qualified person' for purposes of
the ADA. At best. the Social Security determination was evidence for the trial court to consider
in making its own independent determination." Robinson. 94 F.3d at 502 n.2 (citations
omitted). In Eback, the court quoted the Associate Commissioner of Social Security's
declaration that "the ADA and the disability provisions of the Social Security Act have different
purposes and have no direct relationship to each other." Eback. 94 F.3d at 412.
83. See Moore, 139 F.3d at 1213.
84. See 67 U.S.L.W. 3583. For a transcript of oral arguments before the Supreme Court
see 1999 WL 115176.
85. See 67 U.S.L.W. 3535. Justice Scalia suggested that itisreasonable to require a
plaintiff to show a prior assertion of"total disability" on a benefits application is irrelevant to
the ADA claim, was made before the plaintiff-s condition improved, or did not take areasonable
accommodation into account. See id.
86. The Social Security Administration trial work period allows beneficiaries to work for
up to nine months while not affecting their entitlement to benefits or payment levels. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1592(a) (1999).
87. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S.Ct. 1597, 1603-04 (1999).
88. See id. at 1602.
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Clevelandto the district court for further proceedings. 9 Specifically, Justice
Breyer observed that "the two claims [did] not inherently conflict to the point
where courts should apply a special negative presumption like the one
applied" by the Fifth Circuit.9" Justice Breyer's opinion expressed that "[tihe
parties should have the opportunity in the trial court to present, or to contest,
these explanations, in sworn form where appropriate."'"
Subsequent decisions indicate that somejudges appointed by Republican
presidents will continue to narrow the ADA, irrespective of the content of the
record. In the wake of Cleveland,the United States Supreme Court affirmed
Griffith and remanded Moore to the Eighth Circuit.9 2 On remand, Judge
Loken "reinstated" his decision, without any further briefing from the
parties.93 In so doing, Judge Loken quoted selectively from the record,
appearing to reach the result before considering the evidence. For example,
even though Moore had received satisfactory evaluations operating under the
same accommodations she requested, Judge Loken decided that past
performance was not enough.94 Although Moore was performing a similar
store clerk job for another retailer, Judge Loken indicated that the record, in
its present state, was not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether she could perform the "essential functions" of the Payless store
manager position with reasonable accommodation.95 Thus, even though
Payless Shoe Source had given Moore satisfactory evaluations, Judge Loken
ignored Payless Shoe Source's evaluations and substituted his own.96
89. See id. at 1604.
90. Id. at 1602.
91. Id.at 1604.
92. See Griffith. 135 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 1998). cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2018 (1999);
Moore. 119 S. Ct. 2017 (1999).
93. See Moore. 187 F.3d at 845.
94. As discussed below, Judge Beam, with whom Judge Loken voted, decided that an
ADA plaintiff must prove that an accommodation will succeed. See Browning v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1999). Judge Beam, again with Judge Loken, held that
the ADA does not abrogate the immunity granted states under the Eleventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution. See Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir.
1999).
95. Moore. 187 F.3d at 848. The court noted that each time Moore returned to her
position at Payless in 1991 and 1993. with the accommodation she requested in her lawsuit, she
reiniured herself and took an extended leave of absence. See id.
96. In stating that there was no material issue of fact as to whether Moore was not a
qualified individual. Judge Loken addressed an argument that Payless never raised. On the
contrary, Payless simply argued that Moore was estopped from claiming she was a qualified
individual with a disability. Accordingly, Payless's alternative argument that Moore was not
disabled was consistent. Had Payless argued that Moore was not actually qualified, i.e., too
disabled, then Moore's argument on the threshold issue of disability undoubtedly would have
been strengthened. Further, Moore may have used any argument that Moore was too disabled
to establish a "regarded as" claim. One wonders, however, if courts would have estopped
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Consequently, it appears that the Cleveland decision will change little.
Unfortunately, the trend continues in other areas of the ADA as well.
IV. THE FUTURE
Without the involvement of private lawyers, laws guaranteeing equal
access are nothing more than words written in a hard-to-read book. Unfortunately, few new graduates are choosing to enter this field in Arkansas, at least
on the plaintiffs side. Indeed, this author sometimes wonders what role the
ADA will play in the future of his practice. Recent decisions indicate that
some courts will continue to construe the ADA narrowly. Thus, absent further
intervention by the United States Supreme Court, the future is not bright.
As of this writing, Judge Beam, writing for the six-to-four majority in an
Eighth Circuit en banc opinion, held that the ADA does not abrogate the
immunity granted to the states by the Eleventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution.9 7 Interestingly (predictably?), the six to four split was
generally along ideological lines. The split demonstrated in Alsbrook
confirms the past and bodes ill for the future.
As explained above, in Moore, Judge Loken, on the first appeal, adopted
an argument that Payless Shoe Source had never presented. On remand from
the United States Supreme Court, Judge Loken reinstated his decision and
refused to remand to the district court so that Moore could address the facts
of her case in light of Cleveland. Indeed, Payless never argued that Moore
was too disabled. Rather, Payless argued that Moore was estopped. On the
contrary, Payless argued in the district court that Moore was not disabled. Of
course, Judge Loken ultimately determined that Moore was too disabled, the
exact opposite of Payless Shoe Source's argument.9"
Lest one imagine that Judge Loken's opinion in Moore was an aberration,
one need only look to Browning v. Liberty Mutual Life Insurance Co.9 9
Relying upon a non-jurisdictional argument that neither party raised below or
on appeal, the Browning panel reversed a jury verdict of over $250,000 in
favor of Winifred Browning and against Liberty Mutual Insurance Company

employers from claiming employees were not disabled, if the employer argued that the
employees were not qualified individuals with disabilities.
97. See Alsbrook, 184 F.3d 1007. The majority consisted of Judges Bowman, Wollman,
Beam, Loken. Hansen, and Morris Arnold. Judge McMillan wrote a concurring/dissenting
opinion, in which JudgesRichard S. Arnold, Fagg, and Murphy joined.
98. See Moore, 187 F.3d at 848. The court stated that because Moore's previous injuries
required her to take extended leaves of absence she was unable to regularly come to work and
thus unable to satisfy the functions of the job. See id.
99. 178 F.3d 1043 (8th Cir. 1999).
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on June 2, 1999." ° The opinion recognized, "[B]oth parties spent great time
and effort arguing over whether Browning's impairment was a disability under
the ADA, and whether she was terminated because of her disability,"'' 1 but
the panel did not address this issue. Instead, the panel decided that, "We need
not reach these issues because we find that Browning failed to establish that
she was a qualified individual under the ADA at the time of her
termination.' 0 2 The panel reversed the jury's verdict on this basis. 3
At the district court level, Liberty Mutual never contended that Browning
could not "perform the essential functions of her job as it existed before her
surgery."'' " 4 On the contrary, Liberty Mutual argued that she was not a person
with a disability at all.0 5 Accordingly, Liberty Mutual's own medical witness,
Dewayne Bowen, a registered nurse working for the worker's compensation
carrier, stated:
Q.

And in communicating your recommendations to Dr. Hixson,
what were Ms. Browning's restrictions when she returned to
work?

A.

The office visit note that I had and the release that Dr. Hixson
gave stated that she could use her right arm minimally and left
arm, full use of the left arm, and that she could work four
hours a day for two weeks and six hours a day for two weeks
and then go back to full duty."°

Dr. Hixson, Browning's treating physician, testified that Browning could have
done her job:

100. See Browning, 178 F.3d at 1050.
101. Id.at 1047.
102. Id.at 1048. The ADA defines a qualified individual as a person "with a disability
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds .... 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(8) (1994). The court
determined the plaintiff was not a qualified individual because her best case scenario only
allowed her to work four hours a day at ajob that required a full-time employee. See Browning.
178 F.3d at 1048.
103. See Browning, 178 F.3d at 1047. The Court reversed the denial of judgment as a
matter of law.
104. Id.at 1048.
105. See Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Browning v. Liberty Mutual
Life Ins. Co., No. LR-C-95-799 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 23, 1996).
106. Trial Transcript at 497-98, Browning v. Liberty Mutual Life Ins. Co., No. LR-C-95799 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
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Were these accommodations, based on your understanding of
the job description that was attached and your conversations
with Ms. Browning, going to be able for her to perform the job
that she had at Liberty Mutual?

A. I thought so.107
Further, Browning's expert, Pat Hames, an occupational therapist, also
proposed accommodations such as a left-handed keyboard. Pat Hames
testified:
Q.

Now, are you familiar with Winifred Browning's job restrictions as they existed in May and June of 1995?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Are there any-were there available any accommodations that
could have accommodated the keyboarding aspect of her job?

A.

Since she was restricted from using her right arm, there are
keyboards that can be used solely by one hand. They require
a little training and the person may not be quite as fast as they
are with two hands but they are easily learned and they come
close to their former speed.

Q.

All right. Now, what is the length of training?

A.

Oh, of course, it would depend on the individual, but a week
or so for training and practice. They could actually learn the
thing within probably four or five hours, and then they would
need practice to develop their speed.'

107. Trial Transcript at 630, Browning v. Liberty Mutual Life Ins. Co.. No. LR-C-95-799
(E.D. Ark. 1996).
108. Trial Transcript at 424-25, Browning v. Liberty Mutual Life Ins. Co., No. LR-C-95799 (E.D. Ark. 1996).

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

The Browning panel failed to recognize this evidence." Further, Liberty
Mutual argued, "Most importantly, Dr. Hixson stated that Browning could
perform her job at Liberty Mutual as modified.""' In the end, Judge Beam
decided that Browning, at the time she was fired, was too disabled to work."'
The Browning holding created a totally new evidentiary burden that
directly conflicts with prior Eighth Circuit decisions. Previously, an employee
seeking accommodation needed only to make a facial showing that an
accommodation was possible." 2 In Browning, while conceding that the
opinion at least appeared harsh, Judge Beam created a classic Catch-22. Judge
Beam wrote:
Employers are not qualified to predict the degree of success of an employee's recovery from an illness or injury. To afford Browning the
protections of the ADA during the early stages of her recuperation from
surgery, based on her eventual degree of future recovery, would be to
burden Liberty Mutual with the duty to see into the future.'"
Browning never asked Liberty Mutual to see into the future. Browning
simply was unable to return to work full-duty for four weeks. If the Browning
opinion were to stand alone, employers could simply fire employees recently
injured and raise Browning as a defense. Consider, for example, the
individual who learns he is HIV positive during a serious illness. Under
Browning, employers could fire these individuals claiming uncertainty as to
the employees' future ability to perform.
In the Browning opinion, the Court appearedto recognize that leave
might be an accommodation: "This is not to say that a medical leave of
absence cannot be a reasonable accommodation under the appropriate
circumstances. However, the duty to accommodate does not arise unless the
employee will be presently qualified if afforded the accommodation."" 4
Earlier in the opinion, however, the panel stated:
109. In footnote 2. the Eighth Circuit stated. "Browning did testifIy that she felt she could
have performed the essential functions of her job at the end of June. when she was scheduled
to be back to full-time, if she had accommodations-though she did not suggest what
accommodations may have been needed." Browning, 178 F.3d at 1048 n.2. Given Hames's
testimony, it is suggested that the Browning opinion illustrates the value of an adversarial
process in avoiding such myopic opinions.
110. Brief of Appellant at 4. Browning v. Liberty Mutual Life Ins. Co.. 178 F.3d 1043 (8th
Cir. 1999) (No. 97-3620).
II1. See Browning, 178 F.3d at 1049.
112. See Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.. 62 F.3d 1108. 1112 (8th Cir. 1995) ("oncethe
plaintiff makes 'a facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible,' the burden of
production shifts to the employer to show that it is unable to accommodate the employee").
113. Browning. 178 F.3d at 1049.
114. Id.at 1049 n.3 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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Further, it is axiomatic that in order for Browning to show that she could
perform the essential functions of her job, she must show that she is at least
able to show up for work. Browning testified that she was unable to report
to work the entire week of June 5. Even if she could have reported to
work, Browning was limited to only four hours per day and she made no
showing that the essential functions of her full-time job could be performed in four hours.) 5
Obviously, an individual who needs leave, by definition, is unable to show up
for work, i.e., perform the essential functions of her job. Consequently, the
individual who needs leave, however, is never "presently qualified." Thus,
while giving lip service to the availability of leave as an accommodation, the
Browning decision created a situation where no ADA plaintiff who requires
leave can prevail.
The Browning decision's unfortunate "myopia" has apparently arisen in
other cases as well. In Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber,"6 the plaintiff Mole
suffered from multiple sclerosis but claimed that even without accommodation
she was able to carry on her job at a satisfactory level."' Judge Loken, with
Judge Beam voting for majority, held that an ADA plaintiff' s failure to advise
an employer she "need[s] additional accommodation, much less what
accommodation specific to her position and workplace" is needed is fatal to
an ADA claim." 8 Mole produced affidavits from co-workers and customers
who dealt with her and found her work satisfactory." 9 Where this evidence
was favorable to the employee, Judge Loken rejected Mole's claim by
observing: "[s]upporting affidavits from fellow employees who did not deal
with Mole on a systematic basis are insufficient to counter Buckhorn's proof
she was discharged because she did not meet its legitimate expectations."'' 20
Where Judge Loken found no accommodation, Judge Lay characterized
the record as "replete with additional accommodations Mole contends
Buckhorn could have made."''
Furthermore, Mole's physician also listed
several possible accommodations such as medical leaves, limiting work hours,
115. Id. at 1048 (internal citations omitted).
116. 165 F.3d 1212, 1220 (8th Cir. 1999).
117. See Mole, 165 F.3d at 1220 n.5 (Lay, J.,
dissenting).
118. Id.at 1217.
119. See id.at 1220 n.5 (Lay. J..
dissenting). In Browning. of course. Judge Beam relied
on just such evidence as support for reversing the jury's verdict. See Browning, 178 F.3d at
1048.
120. Mole, 165 F.3d at 1218. Judge Lay, citing an opinion written by Judge Beam in
Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393 (8th Cir.1989), argued, "Under the present record, the
reasonableness of the extent of Buckhorn's accommodation should be a question for the trier
of fact." Mole, 165 F.3d at 1220 (Lay. J.,
dissenting).
121. Mole. 165 F.3d at 1220 (Lay. J.,
dissenting).
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allowing breaks during the day, and providing an air-conditioned workplace.'22
Faced with this evidence, Judge Loken decided that the defendant's motion for
summary judgment should be granted because Mole failed to make requests
for accommodations in a timely manner.'23 Judge Lay, dissenting, rejected
this argument, saying, "Such a defense does not logically or factually exist
upon a fair review of the record."' 24 The record apparently reflected that:
Mole made requests for accommodation during ameeting held on July 14,
1994, the effective date of her termination. Mole requested rest breaks,
some days off, time for her doctors to determine the proper prescriptions
and dosages to manage her illness, and fully staffing the customer service
department. She also submitted anote to Buckhorn from Dr. Asher stating
that her MS was causing her work problems.' 25
Considering the above, Judge Lay believed it "difficult to accept the majority
opinion's myopic view of the record."' 2' 6
Thankfully, the Browning case does not stand alone. The Browning
opinion, in fact, apparently represents the minority view in the Eighth
Circuit.'2 7 Indeed, the Arneson and Benson cases have recently been reaffirmed.
In Fjellestadv. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.,' 2s a panel of the Eighth
Circuit held that an employer can be held liable for failing to engage in an
interactive process designed to reach reasonable accommodation. 29 Fjellestad
became a manager of the Yankton, South Dakota Pizza Hut restaurant in
September of 1978.30 As part of his management duties, Fjellestad supervised employees, managed bank deposits, trained and hired employees, and
122. See id. at 1220 n.8 (Lay. J., dissenting).
123. Seeid. at 1218.
124. Id. at 1221 (Lay. J., dissenting).
125. See id.
126. See id. (Lay. J., dissenting).
127. See Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating
that "once the plaintiffmakes a facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible,' the
burden of production shifts to the employer to show that it is unable to accommodate the
employee") (internal citations omitted); Wood v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 437,439 (8th Cir.
1993) (stating that under the Rehabilitation Act a plaintiff need only make a facial showing that
reasonable accommodation is possible and finding that the plaintiff met that burden by
proposing certain accommodations); Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393, 396 (8th Cir. 1989)
(reversing dismissal of Rehabilitation Act claim because the plaintiff was "only required to
provide evidence sufficient to make 'at least a facial showing that reasonable accommodation
is possible'- before the burden shifts to the employer to prove it is unable to make the
accommodation) (internal citation omitted).
128. 188 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1999).
129. See id. at 952.
130. See id. at 947.
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made sure the restaurant was clean. 3 ' As a Pizza Hut unit manager, Fjellestad
was required to work fifty hours per week if she was unable to accomplish her
32
duties in less time.
33
On December 14, 1994, Fjellestad was injured in a car accident.'
Fjellestad was hospitalized, and she was unable to return to work until April
28, 1995.'
On April 28, 1995, Fjellestad returned to work for two hours
every other day.' Obviously, Fjellestad was unable to work fifty hours per
week. Like Browning, Fjellestad was slated to return to work gradually.
Browning, however, was slated to return in one month.' 36 Fjellestad returned
to thirty-five to forty hours per week by December 29, 1995.' Because
Fjellestad was unable to perform the essential functions of her job from April
of 1995 until December of 1995, Pizza Hut could have, under Browning, fired
Fjellestad.
Pizza Hut did not fire Fjellestad until February 8, 1996.' 3s To the
contrary, "[o]n December 12, 1995, a representative from Pizza Hut's human
resources department called Fjellestad about the grievance and told her that
she would be allowed to retain her position as unit manager because her
doctor had released her to work a sufficient number of hours to perform her
duties."' 3 9 Pizza Hut did, however, place Fjellstad on a sixty-day performance
plan. 4 On January 16, 1996, Fjellestad's doctor concluded that she had
reached her maximum recovery.' Pizza Hut fired Fjllestad on February 8,
1996.14"2 Fjellestad then filed grievances asking for accommodation. 4 3 After
those requests were apparently denied, Fjellestad
sued, alleging violations of
44
1990.
of
Act
Disabilities
with
the Americans
In Fellestad,the Eighth Circuit held that "the failure of an employer to
engage in an interactive process to determine whether reasonable accommodations are possible is prima facie evidence that the employer may be acting in
bad faith."' 45 Notably, the Fjellestadpanel did not require the employee to
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
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Seeid.
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See id.
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Id.
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Id.
See id.
See Fjellestad. 188 F.3d at
See id.
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prove the accommodation, as the Browning panel did. 46 Further, the
Fjellestadpanel, unlike the Browningpanel, required Pizza Hut to "extend the
protections of the ADA during the early stages of her recuperation from
surgery."'' 47 Thus, the Fjellestadpanel did not see the search for accommodation, "based on [Fjellestad's] eventual degree of future recovery, would be to
burden [Pizza Hut] with the duty to see into the future."' 41 On the contrary,
the Fjellestadpanel ruled Pizza Hut's failure149to engage in just such a process
might be prima facie evidence of bad faith.
Thus, the Eighth Circuit appears to have split itself. On one side stands
the Browning, Mole, and Moore opinions, and on the other is Benson, Wood,
and Fjellestad. One would be hard-pressed to distinguish Browning and
Fjellestad. At some point, the Eighth Circuit must reconcile these decisions
and establish a principled rule of law, grounded in stare decisis rather than
political philosophy. Until then, the road for ADA plaintiffs is not only too
narrow, but also contains an indefensible split.

146.
denied.
147.
148.
149.

Browning petitioned for rehearing, citing the Fjellestad case, but her petition was
Cf Browning, 178 F.3d at 1049.
Browning, 178 F.3d at 1049.
See Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 952.

